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Daniel Mossé, Professor, Department of Computer Science
Thesis Advisor: Sherif Khattab, Lecturer, Department of Computer Science
ii
Copyright © by Vasco Xu
2020
iii
MAZE: A Secure Cloud Storage Service Using Moving Target Defense and
Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) Tunneling
Vasco Xu, B.Phil
University of Pittsburgh, 2020
Cloud storage services have emerged as a popular destination for businesses and individ-
uals to securely store documents due in part to being virtually accessible anywhere, anytime.
However, cloud storage systems are static attack targets enabling attackers to thoroughly
study the system without fear that their conclusions about the system would be rendered
inaccurate. As such, computer security researchers began exploring techniques, known as
Moving Target Defense (MTD), to turn distributed systems into moving targets. Whereas
traditional defense mechanisms attempt to identify and cover system vulnerabilities, the
underlying philosophy of MTD is that it is impossible to build perfectly secure systems. In-
stead, MTD techniques attempt to constantly change the attack surface in order to increase
the cost (in terms of time and resources) and difficulty of executing successful attacks, in
the first place. Current research in MTD, however, is lacking in implementations of MTD
techniques on real systems (rather than just simulations).
This work presents MAZE, a secure cloud storage system in which the files to be protected
(e.g., security keys, account numbers or passwords) are split into pieces and pseudo-randomly
dispersed within a large, continuously-changing maze of computers. Hopping from one com-
puter to another within MAZE is only possible by following timely created doors, which
are implemented using Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) tunnels. At any computer, there can be
many open doors, each leading to a different computer. In order to retrieve a file, the user
has to follow a schedule that is provided by the MAZE service to authorized users only. The
schedule informs the client of which doors to traverse through to retrieve all the pieces of
the file. In addition, computers within MAZE have two refresh periods: the first restarts
the computer and reloads the system software from a clean copy in order to thwart poten-
tially ongoing attacks, and the second modifies the file pieces to become incompatible with
the file pieces before modification. In order for attackers to successfully retrieve a file, they
iv
must retrieve all file pieces within the second refresh period. We implemented MAZE and
performed a series of experiments that demonstrated the potential of an MTD-based cloud
storage system in protecting against attackers while providing reasonable response time.
v
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In light of the recent COVID-19 pandemic, people have started exploring online alter-
natives to what used to be done in-person. Online collaboration has increased, resulting
in numerous documents (e.g., recorded Zoom meetings, medical data, account numbers, ac-
count passwords) to be stored in cloud storage platforms (e.g., Box, OneDrive, Google Drive,
Dropbox). As a result, public cloud storage providers have become high-profile targets for
attackers during and after the pandemic. For example, as recent as January 2020, a company
called Data Deposit Box, which is a “top rated secure cloud backup storage service for small
businesses” was victim of a data breach which exposed personal information of about 148
customers [6]. The breach was due to a vulnerability in the system configuration, which was
immediately identified and fixed within a day. Gartner Inc., a leading research and advisory
company, estimates that 95% of cloud breaches are due to human errors such as configuration
mistakes [9]. Configuration mistakes are caused not just by the complexity of the system
but also by sheer laziness. This is worrisome, as cloud storages are becoming increasingly
popular for both business and personal use. Therefore, it is easy to see the importance of
cloud security particularly in cloud storage systems.
Independent of the pandemic, cloud storage services have become a desired destination
for people and businesses to store important documents online [8]. Deloitte reports that
58% percent of a total of 500 IT leaders moved to the cloud because of security and data
protection [16]. One of the main reasons to use a cloud storage service is because they
can be accessed anywhere, anytime. The downside of cloud storage systems is that they
are static attack targets. In other words, the software underlying the cloud storage system
is, in most cases, the same in all the machines that run it since most machines serve the
same purpose of storing data while ensuring consistency, availability, and security. Moreover,
defense applications tend to be static; defense mechanisms either attempt to discover and
fix all possible vulnerabilities (e.g., suspicious inputs), by simulating possible attacks, or
try to mitigate an attack once it has already happened. Clever attackers can analyze local
copies of the application and exploit weaknesses therein. Since the same software is run on
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multiple machines, a vulnerability in one copy of the software is likely to also exist in all
other copies. Therefore, exploiting one machine, in a static system, can possibly lead to
many other machines being exploited. In public cloud storages, attackers have the luxury
of time to prepare for an attack by trying to find vulnerabilities within the system. On the
other hand, a defender must be prepared for any possible attack that comes their way, even
before those attacks are launched. In a business setting, one data breach could be enough to
lose all customers. Although many tools and techniques have already been proposed to find
and fix vulnerabilities within cloud systems [25, 46, 48], these tools and techniques are not
enough to protect against cyber-attacks. This limitation exists because (1) as cloud storage
systems become more complex, it becomes harder to find every possible vulnerability, (2)
as cloud storage systems become more intelligent so do attackers and (3) attackers have the
advantage of time to understand and explore the system to its fullest because the system is,
in most cases, open to everyone.
In this thesis we propose MAZE, a secure cloud storage system, which employs a tech-
nique called Moving Target Defense (MTD) to transform a static cloud storage system into
a moving target. In MAZE, important files (encrypted or unencrypted) to be protected are
split into pieces and pseudo-randomly dispersed within a large, continuously-changing maze
of computers. Hopping from one computer to another within MAZE is only possible by
following timely created doors, which are implemented using Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)
tunnels. These doors open and close at pseudo-randomly generated times. At any computer,
there can be many open doors, each leading to a different computer. In order to retrieve
a file, the user has to follow a schedule, provided by the MAZE service to authorized users
only. The schedule informs the user of which doors to traverse through in order to retrieve
all the pieces of the file. At a periodic time epoch, nodes are restarted and system software
is copied over from a secure read-only medium. A small subset of computers in MAZE are
reachable from the Internet (known as the gateways); the gateways are constantly changing
adding a further layer of difficulty for attackers. Without the schedule, an attacker would
blindly follow doors and end up getting lost in the maze.
2
1.1 System Model
The cloud storage system that we consider in this work consists of nodes and files. A
node is a physical or virtual machine. There are three types of nodes: file nodes, gateway
nodes, and client nodes. A file node is used to store files and does not accept connections
from the Internet. A gateway node is a special type of node, within the network, that is
reachable from the Internet (i.e., accepts connections from the Internet). When a user wants
to access the cloud storage system they must first contact a gateway node; they are the entry
points to the system. A client node is also a special type of node that is not part of the
cloud storage system itself. It is the machine that users utilize to access the cloud storage.
Each client node has a public IP address and can accept incoming network connections on
that address (e.g., incoming connections from file nodes). We consider client authentication
to be assumed and orthogonal to this work [18, 21, 47]. We call a collection of nodes a
cluster. A cluster can be either owned by a company or an individual who has access to a
cluster personally or through a cloud service provider, such as Amazon AWS or Microsoft
Azure. Lastly, files are documents (e.g., Zoom recordings, photos, account numbers) that a
user wants to store within the cloud storage system. Files may or may not be encrypted for
further protection and must be able to be split into file pieces [28], each containing different
parts of the file.
The cloud storage system configuration can be thought of as a graph of nodes with edges
connecting them as seen in Figure 1. The cloud represents the public network that the nodes
are under. Each vertex (circle) in the graph represents a file node (non-shaded), a gateway
(in green) or a client node (in orange). We note that client nodes access MAZE through a
gateway node, since gateways are the entry points to the system. The dashed line stemming
from the client node to the gateway node represents the secure two-way connection between
those two nodes. In Figure 1, we only display one client node, but the cloud storage system
can support many client nodes. The dashed arrow stemming from file nodes to the client
node represents a secure one-way connection between the two nodes for transferring of files.
Each edge (non-dashed line) inside the graph represents a connection (i.e., networking link)
between two vertices. Networking links are predefined by the system administrator and do
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not change very often. Networking links could either be physical links or virtual links. A
physical link exists between nodes that are directly connected to each other through physical
wires. A virtual link, on the other hand, exists between nodes that are connected to each
other in the network graph/topology, but not necessarily directly connected in the underlying
network of physical links. We assume that the network is reliable and permanent. The file
pieces are shown as blue squares within the file nodes.
Figure 1: The MAZE cloud storage system consists of gateways nodes, file nodes, file pieces
and client nodes. Files nodes are used to store file pieces and are not directly reachable from
the Internet. Gateway nodes are directly reachable from the Internet and are therefore, the
entry-points to the system. The client node is the machine of the user that wants to access
the MAZE system, which must have a public IP address.
1.2 Threat Model and Assumptions
We assume that the goal of an attacker is to retrieve a specific file inside the cloud
storage system as opposed to wanting to retrieve every possible file or any file. At any point
in time, an attacker could have multiple agents (i.e., a process that runs a script to perform
an automated task on a single node). An attack is considered successful when an attacker
retrieves all file pieces before a node refreshes. On a node refresh, attacker agents are evicted
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from the system, and file pieces are modified in such a way that they become incompatible
(i.e., cannot be glued back together) with file pieces before modification. The modification of
file pieces can be achieved through a technique known as proactive secret sharing [31, 50, 42],
which is orthogonal to this work. Node refreshes are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Our attack model considers attackers who are able to retrieve any file by taking control of
a growing subset of nodes. In other words, attackers can take control of nodes incrementally,
one at a time, but not all of them at once. Because we model the MAZE cloud storage
system configuration as a graph, an attacker can perform a breadth-first search or a depth-
first search to visit all the nodes. Also, we assume that an attacker does not know how many
pieces a file was split into and which nodes those pieces are stored in and thus would have to
perform a full traversal in order to retrieve all possible file pieces. Attackers can recognize
file pieces, either from their names or using content analysis, but do not know how many of
these pieces there are.
We consider attackers to be unauthorized users and thus do not have direct access to
the MAZE system. We assume that attackers cannot break authentication or steal client
credentials or access keys. Therefore, when we say that an attacker compromises a node, we
assume they did so without access to any of the client’s credentials. We define compromising
a node as the act of gaining control and access to a node by other unauthorized means, such
as exploiting a vulnerability in the system configuration. Since only the gateway node is
accepting connections from the Internet, attacker agents must initiate their attack from a
gateway node. In addition, we assume that attacker agents cannot escalate their privileges
to administrator or root privileges.
Fault tolerance is important in distributed systems, such as cloud storage systems, as
data is expected to be accessible anywhere, anytime. Data stored in a cloud storage system
should be replicated to ensure that if one node is down, other nodes should be able to serve
the desired data. In this work, fault tolerance is assumed and considered to be orthogonal
to this work [34, 24, 27]. We do not consider network compromises, that is, attackers cannot
open and close networking links between nodes. In other words, attackers cannot control
(add, edit, or remove) edges of the graph nor add or remove nodes from the system.
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1.3 Problem and Thesis Statements
The key problem addressed in this work is how to build a secure cloud storage under
certain constraints from the perspective of the defender while providing reasonable perfor-
mance. From a defense perspective, we want to build a system such that, given an attacker
with a certain number of malicious agents, and a specific time limit (i.e., before a node
refresh) to retrieve files, the probability of retrieving all file pieces within the time limit
is very low. From a performance perspective, given a certain number of nodes, users, and
files pieces, we aim to build a cloud storage system that provides adequate response time in
addition to security.
This thesis explores the possibility of emulating the structure and difficulty of a physical
maze to secure computer systems while maintaining reasonable response time. We achieve
the aforementioned by using Moving Target Defense and tunneling, which dynamically re-
configures the system to confuse attackers, similar to how some paths in a physical maze are
meant to confuse the people within it. Overall, this thesis presents MAZE, a secure cloud
storage system using Moving Target Defense and tunneling, details its implementation, and
evaluates the system in terms of performance and security.
1.4 Outline
This chapter introduced the importance of secure cloud storage services and how this
work plans to improve upon it, along with the assumptions that we made while designing
and building the system.
Chapter 2 provides background information of the methods and techniques used in
building the proposed system and a comprehensive review of literature related to this work.
Chapter 3 presents MAZE, a secure cloud storage using MTD and SSH Tunneling,
detailing two design approaches and tradeoffs between performance and security.
Chapter 4 details the implementation of MAZE, the experiment setup, the testbed
implementation, and evaluates MAZE in terms of performance and security.
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Chapter 5 discusses limitations of the MAZE cloud storage system and proposes possible
solutions and future work.
1.5 Definitions
In this thesis, there are a few keywords that are worth noting because they are used to
describe concepts prevalent throughout this work. The keywords and their definitions are
provided below:
• Node: A machine (or virtual-machine) that is part of the MAZE cloud storage system.
• Tunneling: Secure movement of data over an unsecure network. Tunneling typically
involves secure communication between two private networks to be made over a public
network, such as the Internet. All the communication between the two private networks
goes through a forwarding point (i.e., a separate machine responsible for the actual
forwarding of data between the other machines).
• Tunnel: An abstract representation of the secure communication channel used in tun-
neling. It is represented as a source end-point, destination end-point, and a forwarding
point. An end-point consists of an IP address and a port number. The goal of tunnels
in MAZE is such that in order for a program to traverse (i.e., connect) to another node,
it connects to a local server socket (listening at a specified port on the local machine),
which in turn securely forwards the network traffic to the destination end-point through
the forwarding point.
• Schedule: A series of tunnels that connect a list of nodes together.
• Gateway: A machine (i.e., node) that accepts connections from the Internet. They are
the entry-points to the MAZE system.
• Black-hole: A node that does not store any file pieces and is not used as a source end-
point of any tunnels (only used as a destination end-point). As such, it has no outgoing
tunnels, only incoming ones.
• MAZE software package: A collection of software programs that are installed on
nodes for MAZE to work.
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• Service-side: Service-side programs are responsible for computing the schedule and
establishing a series of tunnels based on the schedule.
• Client-side: Client-side programs are responsible for traversing a series of tunnels to
store or retrieve a file.
8
2.0 Background and Related Work
Moving Target Defense (MTD) is a relatively new sub-field of cybersecurity that attempts
to balance the unfair advantage attackers have due to their unpredictability. MTD techniques
continuously change a system’s attack surface with the aim of increasing the costs (time
and resources) of an attack while simultaneously decreasing the success of an attack. In
cybersecurity, defenders try to build defense mechanisms against possible vulnerabilities
and attacks. However, attackers have the advantage of time to try and find possible ways
around the defense mechanisms and deploy their attacks. In MTD, a defender becomes an
unpredictable target, constantly changing its properties to avoid being attacked.
In this section, we review cloud storage systems, describe MTD in detail, provide an
overview of SSH tunneling, and provide a literature review of recent MTD techniques.
2.1 Cloud Storage Services
Cloud storage is a service for saving data in an offsite location that can be accessed from
the Internet or a private network. Data saved on a cloud storage is managed by a third-party
who is responsible for keeping the data safe, consistent and available. Cloud storages are
built as an alternative to physical hard drives, which have the downsides of only being able
to store finite amounts of data and not being highly accessible. The advantage of cloud
storages are that they can be accessed anywhere, anytime. Customers do not worry about
managing the data and only have to pay for what they need. There are typically three
types of cloud storages: public, private, and hybrid. A public cloud storage is one that can
be accessed through the Internet. Therefore, any device with Internet connectivity (e.g.,
mobile phone, tablet or computer) can access a public cloud storage. Examples include Box,
Dropbox and Google Drive. A private cloud storage is one that resides within a company’s
network. Therefore, they can only be accessed when connected to the company’s network
either physically or through a VPN. The primary difference between a public and a private
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cloud storage is that the servers in a public cloud storage are shared across customers whereas
in a private cloud storage,customers have servers dedicated for their use only. Therefore,
private cloud storages are considered to be safer and deliver better performance (in terms of
speed). In addition, it is common for servers powering private cloud storages to be physically
located inside the company, giving the company greater control. A hybrid cloud storage is
the use of both a public and a private cloud storage. For instance, highly sensitive data is
stored on the private cloud and less-sensitive data is stored on the public cloud [4, 14].
Cloud storages can be further categorized into file, block or object storages which present
and organize data in different ways, each to serve a different purpose. File storage systems
organize data similar to how file systems organize data in modern operating systems. Files
are stored inside folders and the full path to a file is required when trying to access that
file. Block storage systems splits data into singular blocks (i.e., pieces) of data, each with its
own address (a unique ID for the block). Blocks can be distributed to other nodes and be
configured to work on different operating systems that better suit its needs. The underlying
system is responsible for assembling the blocks and presenting the data to the user. Since
blocks do not have a path, they can be retrieved quickly through its unique ID (i.e., their
address). Block storages are commonly used for databases, which require low-latency and are
suitable for RAID systems (since the data is already in blocks) [38]. Object storage systems
organize data in a flat hierarchy and are best suited for data that is written once but read
many times (e.g., video). Data is split into pieces, known as objects, where each object is
comprised of three components: the data (i.e., content) of the object, a unique identifier, and
metadata. The unique identifier allows for fast retrieval of the data; the metadata contains
contextual information such as size, date, and may even contain detailed information about
the contents of the data itself (e.g. location, or name of actors for a video file). Modification
of the data results in the creation of a new object. Therefore, object storages are useful
for storing static data (i.e., data that is not regularly modified), such as video and music.
Amazon S3 is a well-known example of an object storage [15, 7, 2, 3].
MAZE can be implemented as a standalone cloud storage system or be integrated within
existing cloud storages to enhance their security. Although in this work we present MAZE
as a public file storage system, the techniques used in designing and building MAZE can be
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applied to any type of cloud storage. MAZE just needs access to a cluster of machines (i.e.,
servers), which could reside in a public or private cloud.
2.2 Moving Target Defense
MTD is an emerging security paradigm that aims to balance the asymmetric advantage
of attackers in that, in non-MTD systems, they have time to study and execute well thought
out attacks that exploit unknown vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, defenders have to discover or
predict all possible vulnerabilities and either fix them or create defense mechanisms against
them. The contributing reason for such an imbalance in the cybersecurity field, is the static
nature of computer systems. MTD aims to increase the difficulty and cost of executing
attacks by constantly changing and randomizing the properties of a computer system such
that attackers are faced with a greater deal of uncertainty, thus shifting the advantage over
to the defenders.
MTD is a scalable cybersecurity solution. A system that employs MTD reduces the
need to have advanced threat detection. Threat detection is hard, time-consuming, and
sometimes unreliable because it may result in false-positives (i.e, detecting an attack when
there is none). MTD lessens the burden on threat detection software and cybersecurity
teams because it shifts the power to the defenders. Since the attack surface constantly
changes, the attacker has a harder time to attack because they have to constantly locate the
target. In addition, as computer systems and their infrastructure grow over time, attackers
typically gain an advantage because there are more possible entry points to attack. For
example, adding new servers means that attackers have more servers to try and infiltrate.
With static infrastructure, defense teams work hard to ensure everything is safe by having
to either find issues themselves or wait until they happen in order to correct them, at which
point, it may be too late. Therefore, static infrastructure is not scalable because with
increased infrastructure, defense teams have to work even harder to find every possible bug
or vulnerability and fix them or create defense mechanisms for.
The work in [37] categorizes MTD techniques by the different layers of a computer system
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that MTD can randomize. In this section, we cover MTD techniques for the following layers:
platform layer (i.e., the hardware components and the operating system), networking layer,
runtime environment, and software application. We can think of these layers as levels, such
that if one level does not employ MTD, the level underneath can employ MTD and still
provide adequate security. For example, application developers can embed MTD techniques
directly into their software. If application developers do not embed MTD, then the runtime
system can transform a non MTD-aware software into a secure system. If the runtime system
does not employ MTD, then the operating system or the networking layer can embed MTD
techniques to provide security and protection against attacks targeted at the layers above.
2.2.1 Dynamic Platform Techniques
Dynamic platform techniques involve changing properties of the underlying platform,
such as building applications that can run on top of multiple operating systems and hardware
architectures. The aforementioned can be achieved by compiling for different architectures,
such as compiling the Linux kernel for both x86 and ARM. The major benefit of dynamic
platforms are that they help prevent platform-dependent attacks. Attackers often develop
attacks by exploiting bugs in the underlying platform such as in Spectre [33] and Meltdown
[35]. Applications that run on different platforms result in attackers requiring more time to
develop attacks for multiple platforms. However, this technique comes with several notewor-
thy drawbacks. First, it cannot defend against attacks targeted at higher-level applications.
For example, an application that runs on multiple architectures cannot prevent SQL injec-
tions [30]. In addition, a dynamic platform typically results in a more complex system, which
may be even harder to maintain and lead to more bugs. The main weakness of a dynamic
platform is that if a user has an exploit for Windows, they can just wait until the software
migrates to Windows and run their exploit. Therefore, dynamic platform techniques are
useful only when the attacker must comprise all platforms to succeed.
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2.2.2 Dynamic Network Techniques
Dynamic network techniques change the properties of the network to complicate network-
based attacks. Popular techniques in this category revolve around dynamically changing a
host’s IP address in order to increase the difficulty of locating the host. An example of a
network-based MTD technique is to dynamically mutate the IP address and port number
of a sender and receiver. The aforementioned can be achieved using a cryptographic hash
function, in such a way that only the two communicating hosts can obtain each other’s
next addresses [43]. A real-life analog is the military’s use of frequency-hopping, in which
frequencies of radio transmissions are repeatedly switched in order to reduce interference
and avoid interception.
2.2.3 Dynamic Runtime Techniques
The runtime environment of an application refers to the layer of abstraction provided
by the operating system to higher-level applications. The most important abstraction is the
use of virtual memory addresses, which are translated by the operating system to physical
addresses in memory. This abstraction creates the illusion that computers have much greater
main memory than they actually have. Dynamic runtime techniques change the abstraction
provided by the operating system to the application layer. The most well-known example of
a dynamic runtime technique is Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [45], which
randomizes virtual addresses of the many components of a running program. ASLR is
currently implemented in many versions of Windows OS, Mac OS and Linux. In ASLR, the
address location of the base executable, stack, heap, and libraries are randomized such that
an attacker does not know where to place their malicious code. ASLR is designed to guard
against memory corruption bugs such as buffer-overflow attacks [26].
2.2.4 Dynamic Software Techniques
Dynamic software techniques aim to diversify the internals of a software application such
as a multicompiler, which can produce different versions of a software from the same source
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code. Multicompilers use several methods to achieve the aforementioned, for instance, the
use of padding to make the size of memory regions unpredictable. They can also use non-
operation (NOP) instructions that do not perform any action but change the location of
other instructions. The hope with dynamic software techniques is that if an attack works
on a variant of the application it is unlikely to work on another variant. For example, if
multiple machines run the same software and an attacker successfully develops malware that
compromises a machine with the target software, then the attacker can just use the same
malware to compromise other machines. Dynamic software lessens the chance that the same
malware will work on other machines effectively preventing large-scale attacks. In addition,
dynamic software can be used as a measure against code reuse attacks [20]. Some attackers
reuse the target software’s code against itself because the target software may have defenses
against foreign code. However, dynamic software increases the difficulty and cost of code
reuse attacks because the location of code and instructions are different on different versions
of the software. A drawback of dynamic software techniques is that software applications
are typically compiled with special optimization flags. Therefore, introducing randomness
in the memory layout through dynamic software techniques may no longer provide the same
performance speedup from the optimization flags.
We categorize MAZE as a dynamic networking technique due to its use of tunneling to
redirect connections to different machines.
2.3 Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
Secure Shell (SSH) is a protocol that provides a cryptographically secure connection
between two hosts over an unsecure network [49]. SSH can be used for remote command-line
access, file transfer and tunneling. SSH was designed as a replacement to Telnet [39], which
transferred packets unencrypted over the internet. In the Telnet protocol, anyone with a
packet sniffer could eavesdrop on the contents of the packet, which becomes problematic
when those packets contain personal or secret information.
MAZE uses the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol in its implementation because it allows for
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secure remote command-line access and supports tunneling, both of which are fundamental
to the design of MAZE as will be described in Chapter 3.
2.3.1 SSH Protocol Overview
SSH splits data into a series of packets containing the following fields: packet length,
padding amount, payload, additional padding and Message Authentication Code (MAC).
The entire packet, except for the packet length and the MAC, are encrypted. To secure
the connection between client and server, SSH uses three data manipulation techniques:
symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption and hashing. Symmetric encryption is used
by SSH to encrypt the entire connection. The secret key is generated using the Diffie Hellman
Key Exchange [22]. Data sent through SSH is encrypted and decrypted using this secret key.
Asymmetric encryption is used in SSH by the server to authenticate the client. This process
is commonly called SSH-key based authentication. The client creates a key-pair and uploads
the public key to any server it wishes to access. Once a secure connection has been established
between client and server through symmetric encryption, the server authenticates the client
by sending a challenge message, encrypted with the client’s public key, to the client. If the
client is able to decrypt it, then it has proven that it has the associated private key and
is therefore, authenticated. Hashing is used in SSH to calculate the MAC, which ensures a
received message was not corrupted or altered. The MAC is calculated as the hash of the
symmetric key, sequence number and the data. When the packet arrives at its destination,
the receiver calculates the same hash of the data and compares it against the MAC in the
received packet to ensure its integrity.
2.3.2 SSH Tunneling
SSH tunneling is a method for transporting arbitrary unencrypted data over a secure SSH
connection. SSH supports several types of tunneling, but in this section, we focus primarily
on two, as they are directly related to this work: direct port forwarding and reverse
port forwarding [13]. In direct port forwarding, the client machine, running an SSH client
opens a tunnel and forwards any data that it is sent to an SSH server. The SSH server can
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live on the end-point (where the data ultimately wants to arrive) or be separate from the
end-point, in which case the SSH server connects to the end-point and sends it the encrypted
data. For example, it is common for schools to install proxy filters to prevent students from
visiting social media websites while connected to school WiFi. Direct port forwarding can be
used to bypass such a restriction. We consider a school computer called school connected
to the school WiFi, and a home computer called home connected to home WiFi. The client
running on the school computer can use the following command to setup a tunnel from the
school computer to the home computer in order to access www.facebook.com:
ssh -L 5000:www.facebook.com:80 home (executed by ‘school’)
The above command binds port 5000 on the client machine to listen for local requests.
When the port is connected to by an application, the SSH client proceeds to connect to
an SSH server running on home. The SSH server on home is responsible for accessing
www.facebook.com and tunnels (i.e., sends) that data back to school, effectively bypass-
ing the firewall. It is important to note that the tunnel (i.e, the connection between home
and school) is encrypted while the connection between home and www.facebook.com is un-
encrypted. In essence, home is acting as a forwarding point to perform requests on school’s
behalf. We also note that web traffic data as well as any other type of data can be transferred
through tunnels. The generic command for direct port forwarding is as follows:
ssh -L <local-listening-port>:<remote-host>:<remote-port> <forwarding-point>
In reverse port forwarding, the client machine establishes a tunnel to the server but once
the tunnel is established, the server listens on a port. Whenever a connection is made to
that port on the server, the data is sent back to the client. Consider, we are at home and
want to access an internal university resource from our home. We again use the names
home and school to represent the home and school computer respectively. Reverse port
forwarding enables us to access internal university resources from home by executing the
following command from the school machine:
ssh -R 5000:www.internal-site.com:80 home (executed by ‘school’)
Upon execution, the SSH client at school connects to the SSH server running at home
creating an SSH channel to transfer data. Then, the SSH server at home binds to port 5000,
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listening for local requests. Incoming local requests are forwarded through the newly created
SSH channel to school, which performs the requests and forwards the data back to home.
The generic command for reverse port forwarding is as follows:
ssh -R <local-listening-port>:<remote-host>:<remote-port> <forwarding-point>
2.3.3 libssh
libssh is a C library that implements the SSHv1 and SSHv2 protocols for both client
and server applications [10]. It provides an API for developers to write programs that use
the SSH protocol. In this section we give a brief introduction on how to use libssh, focusing
mainly on features that were used to build MAZE.
2.3.3.1 SSH Session To establish an SSH connection with libssh, we allocate a new
SSH session object by calling the function ssh new(), which returns an ssh session object
(i.e., an abstract representation of an SSH session). Similar to standard functions in C,
libssh follows the allocate-deallocate pattern. An object allocated with xxxxx new() must
be deallocated using xxxxx free(). Then, we use the function ssh options set(...) to
set options for the SSH session. The important SSH options are:
• SSH OPTIONS HOST: name or IP address of host to connect to.
• SSH OPTIONS PORT: port number of host to connect to (default is 22).
• SSH OPTIONS USER: the user under which to connect to.
• SSH OPTIONS LOG VERBOSITY: log additional details.
Once a session is established, we can connect to an SSH server using ssh connect(...),
passing it the ssh session object we created.
2.3.3.2 Authentication After connecting to an SSH server, we authenticate both the
server and the user. The server is authenticated to ensure that it is known and safe to
connect to. Server authentication can be performed using the verify knownhost(...)
function, which takes in a ssh session object as a parameter. verify knownhost(...)
is not part of the standard libssh API but its implementation can be found on the libssh
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website [10]. The user is authenticated so the server can identify a user and verify their
identity. libssh supports several methods of user authentication. The most common user
authentication method is by using a password. A password is sent to the server, and it either
accepts it or not. The second method is key-based authentication described in Section 2.3.1.
Once the user is authenticated, the server grants it access to many resources such as port
forwarding. In this work, key-based authentication is used.
2.3.3.3 SSH Tunnels libssh supports two types of tunneling:
direct port forwarding and reverse port forwarding.
• Direct Port Forwarding In direct port forwarding, the client machine opens a tunnel
to the server at a specific port. When an application at the client machine connects to
localhost at that port, their data is forwarded to the server. In order to perform direct
port forwarding using libssh, we create a separate channel to be used for tunneling,
since SSH channels process only a single service. SSH channels are created using the
ssh channel new(...), which takes in an ssh session object as a parameter. Then,
we open a forwarding channel with the ssh channel open forward(...) function. To
perform the actual forwarding, we use the ssh channel write(...) function to write
incoming data to the server.
• Reverse Port Forwarding In reverse port forwarding, the server listen on a port;
whenever a connection is made to that port on the server, the incoming data is forwarded
back to the client. In order to perform reverse port forwarding using libssh, we ask server
to listen for incoming connections at specific port using the
ssh channel listen forward(...) function. In order to accept incoming TCP/IP
connections we use the ssh channel accept forward(...) function. Once a TCP/IP
connection is accepted, a ssh channel object is returned. Then, we read data from the
SSH channel using the ssh channel read nonblocking(...) function and send that
data to the client using the ssh channel write(...) function.
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2.4 Related Work
The use of MTD in securing cloud storage systems is not unique to this work. Many
companies have already seen much success creating data storage technologies that implement
different strategies of MTD, such as CryptoMove [5] and Nexitech [11]. However, we have
noticed a lack in working implementations of MTD-based systems (as opposed to simulations
or emulations) in MTD research [43]. Therefore, the main contribution of this research is the
design, implementation, and experimental evaluation of a working MTD-based secure cloud
storage system. MAZE employs techniques (e.g., tunneling) that have been explored in the
field of MTD but not directly applied to securing cloud storage systems. For example, the
work in [19] uses tunneling to protect against packet sniffers from determining the end-points
(i.e., sender and receiver) of transferring packets. The client’s port is constantly changing
over time but its traffic is redirected the correct server through tunnels.
OpenFlow Random Host Mutation (OF-RHM) [32] randomly mutates IP addresses of
end-hosts such that attackers have greater difficulty locating the target. OF-RHM employs
Software Defined Networking (SDN) and OpenFlow for managing the mutation of IP ad-
dresses. Each host is given a virtual IP address, which is translated to their real IP address
by OpenFlow tables. Simulation results show that OF-RHM can reduce the accuracy of
information gathering via scanning by 99% and save 90% of network hosts from scanning
worms. The drawback of OF-RHM is that hosts can still be reached through DNS.
Packet Header Randomization (PHEAR) [44] proposes an MTD technique that leverages
SDN to securely route traffic in enterprise networks. PHEAR dynamically and transparently
removes network identifiers (e.g., MAC and IP address) from packet headers while still cor-
rectly routing packets to the correct destination through SDNs. PHEAR attempts to improve
upon the drawback of OF-RHM, which was that it distributed virtual IP addresses through
DNS, allowing any host (or attacker) to perform a DNS lookup to obtain the target’s virtual
IP address. Instead, PHEAR consists of end-host proxies which replace packet identifiers
with short-lived pseudonyms. An SDN controller is responsible for routing the modified
packets based on the pseudonyms. The experimental results of PHEAR demonstrate that it
provides low-latency and high throughput, enough for interactive applications such as web
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browsing.
Catch Me If You Can [29] is an MTD framework that combines address mutation, net-
work stack scrambling and decoy deployment. Address mutation provides randomization
of network addresses (e.g., IP addresses) resulting in a target machine harder to locate.
Addresses are determined such that they are unpredictable by a third-party but determin-
istically computable by authorized users. This is achieved through one-way hash functions.
The paper explores the possibility of IP address collisions and provides a few possible solu-
tions for it, such as changing the input to the hash function or by simply incrementing the
IP address (which is less secure). Network stack randomization prevents host identification
based on the communication stack. Decoy deployment employs methods for detecting and
stalling an attacker once they are inside the system. For example, traps are placed within
the system, which triggers defense mechanisms to trap the attacker.
Mayflies [17] is a fault-tolerant MTD framework for distributed systems. Nodes (i.e.,
servers and replicas) exist for a short period of time to perform some task or computation
and then are destroyed and reincarnated on a different platform with different characteristics
(e.g., different OS). Mayflies attempts to defend against progressive attacks or limit the
duration of a successful undetected attack. An ongoing attack becomes ineffective in a
reincarnated node due to its different characteristics. The paper on Mayflies focuses heavily
on evaluating the performance of Mayflies but does not analyze or evaluate its security.
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3.0 MAZE Design
The MAZE cloud storage system has two variations, namely reactive MAZE and proac-
tive MAZE, each with its pros and cons. Both approaches are divided into two parts: the
service-side and the client-side. The service-side is responsible for preparing the nodes (e.g.,
node refreshes), generating the schedule, and following the schedule to establish the appro-
priate tunnels. The client-side is responsible for receiving parameters from a user (e.g., path
to a file and password) and following the generated schedule to store or retrieve a file based
on the user’s parameters. Figure 2 provides a general outline of the responsibilities of the
client and service-side, where detailed descriptions of each specific responsibility is described
in Section 3.1. The rectangles in red represent features not currently implemented in MAZE.
In this chapter, we describe the underlying architecture of the MAZE cloud storage
system. In this work, we focus on the development and implementation of the reactive ap-
proach. Therefore, when we refer to MAZE in this work, we are referring to the reactive
approach. Both approaches share common building blocks (e.g., establishing of tunnels, stor-
ing and retrieving of files, and a command-line program to interact with MAZE) therefore,
the proactive approach can be built by weaving in components from the reactive approach.
In Section 3.1, we outline the design of reactive MAZE in detail, and in Section 3.3, we give
a general overview of proactive MAZE.
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Figure 2: We divide the design of MAZE into two parts: service-side and client-side. The
rectangles in red represent features not implemented in the prototype described in Chapter 4
.
3.1 Reactive Approach
The reactive MAZE approach involves establishing tunnels on-demand. In other words,
tunnels are only established once a user wants to store or retrieve a file. The client program
(a command-line program) runs on the user’s machine and is responsible for accepting pa-
rameters from the user and sending them to the gateway. The client program accepts three
parameters: whether to store or retrieve a file, the path to the file, and a password. The
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gateway runs a socket server, listening for requests from client programs. Once a request is
received, the gateway parses the user’s parameters and uses them to initiate the tunnel setup
process. The tunnel setup process involves splitting the file into pieces (where the number
of pieces is equal to the number of tunnels), and then using the password to create and
build the schedule (i.e., establishing the tunnels). The password is used to deterministically
determine which nodes and ports to establish tunnels between. At a high-level the schedule
generation works as follows: we hash the password and use the first two bytes of the hash
output to determine the port of the source end-point of the tunnel, the middle two bytes to
determine the destination end-point’s IP address, and the last two bytes to determine the
destination end-point’s port number. We repeat the aforementioned process for the number
of desired tunnels. Ideally, we would want to hash the concatenation of the password with
a secret client token to lessen the chances of hash collisions; however, client authentication
is out of the scope of this work.
We limit the connections to the tunnel end-points such that they can only accept connec-
tions from localhost. Therefore, in order to traverse to a different node, a program must
connect to localhost at a specific port on the current node. In other words, programs can-
not directly connect to a different node through SSH. They must follow the tunnels, which
redirects their connections. At any given time, there could be multiple tunnels stemming
from the same node but at different source port numbers and to different destinations.
The file pieces are split in such a way that each piece is numbered. We can therefore,
define a file as F = {f1, ..., fn} where:
• F : represents a file.
• n: represents the number of pieces.
• fi: represents a file piece.
3.1.1 Service-Side
The MAZE service-side is responsible for preparing the nodes (hardening of nodes and
node refreshes), generating a schedule based on the password, and iterating through the
schedule to establish the appropriate tunnels.
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In MAZE, nodes are hardened such that the cost of traversing a regular network link
is much greater than the cost of traversing a tunnel. Hardening a node involves limiting
the connections to the tunnel end-points such that they can only accept connections from
localhost. Traversing a regular networking link by an attacker requires exploiting a vul-
nerability in a networking server on the target node. Due to the difficulty of traversing a
networking link, we assume that attacker agents use tunnels to hop between nodes. Client
programs also rely on tunnels to access hardened nodes. Tunnels are one-use only, once a
program traverses through a tunnel, no other program or attacker can use that tunnel.
Each node has two refresh periods: (1) nodes are restarted and the system software is
copied over from a secure read-only medium; and (2) file pieces are modified to become
incompatible (i.e., unable to be glued back together) with file pieces before modification. In
the first refresh period, tunnels are torn down and re-established, and any attack agents are
evicted from the node and have to regain control over the node. In the second refresh period,
file pieces are modified using proactive secret sharing. In order for an attack to succeed, an
attacker must capture all file pieces, in one pass, before the attack agents are killed by the
periodic refresh. If an attacker retrieves a subset of the file pieces and then is killed and
reattempts to connect to retrieve more file pieces, the newly retrieved file pieces become
incompatible with the previously retrieved ones. In other words, file pieces collected over
different refresh periods can no longer be glued back together to form a single coherent file.
Having more tunnels make it harder for an attacker to retrieve all file pieces, in time, before
the refresh.
To further increase difficulty for an attacker, we setup black-hole tunnels, in which the
end-point of the tunnel is a node that never stores any files and does not have any outgoing
tunnels. Therefore, when an attack agent traverses through black-hole tunnels, they arrive
at a node in which there are no tunnels setup and an attacker agent is effectively stuck.
While in black-hole nodes, attack agents are unable to hop to other nodes and there are no
file pieces to retrieve. Attack agents in black-hole nodes are eventually killed during refresh.
File storage space in the MAZE system is organized as drawers of data. Each file node
contains a large number of drawers where each drawer contains the content of a file piece
or gibberish data, meant to confuse attackers and increase the cost of being able to retrieve
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every file piece. The name of each drawer is pseudo-randomly generated and all drawers are
of the same size, such that the name or the size of a drawer reveals no information about
the data. In order for an attacker to retrieve a file piece they must know which drawer it is
in, using content analysis for example.
3.1.1.1 Schedule Generation The schedule generation algorithm is responsible for gen-
erating an array of consecutive tunnels for the client to traverse in order to store or retrieve
a file. Consecutive tunnels refers to when tunnels are established from a source to a desti-
nation, and the source of the next tunnel is the destination of the previous tunnel.
The schedule generation algorithm uses hashing to determine source and destination
end-points of tunnels from the user’s password. Given a password, we build a schedule using
certain bytes of the hashed password to determine the source port number, the destination
node (uniquely identified by its IP address), and the destination port number. The source
port number refers to the port number at the current node at which to connect to in order
to traverse through the tunnel. The destination node and the destination port number are
the end-points of the tunnel where file pieces are ultimately stored. Tunnels are established
between two machines in such a way that connecting to localhost on the source port number
redirects the connection to the destination node at the destination port number, effectively
traversing that tunnel.
The first node the client program connects to, is the gateway. From the gateway, there
are three pieces of information it needs to know in order to establish a tunnel: (1) the source
port number, (2) the destination node and (3) the destination port number. The three
aforementioned pieces of information can be computed from the user’s password. First,
the schedule generation algorithm hashes the password and uses the first two bytes of the
hash output to determine the source port number, the middle two bytes to determine the
destination node, and the last two bytes to determine the destination port number. We
convert those bytes into integer values, and for the port numbers ensure that the integer
values fall between the range of valid TCP server port numbers (1,024 and 65,535). In order
to determine the destination node (i.e., its IP address), we use the converted integer value
as an index into an array of MAZE nodes and their associated IP addresses.
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Figure 3 provides an example of how a string of 256 bytes can be used to determine the
source port number, destination node, and destination port number. The first two bytes
(bytes 0 and 1) are used for calculating the source port number, the middle two bytes (bytes
127 and 128) are used for calculating the destination node and the last two bytes (bytes 254
and 255) are used for calculating the destination port number.
Formally, we define a schedule as S =< Tunneli > where:
• Tunneli represents a single tunnel.
• Tunnel0 = h(password) and Tunneli = h(Tunneli−1)
• h(...) represents a hash function.
Figure 3: Deriving tunnel end-points from a 256-byte password hash.
Figure 4 demonstrates the schedule generation process. The schedule is an array of
tunnels, where the previously hashed output is hashed once again in order to obtain a new
hash output of which we can follow the above formula to determine the tunnel end-points.
In Section 4.2, we experiment with a varied number of tunnels and evaluate the performance.
We could also pseudo-randomly determine the number of tunnels by using certain bytes from
the hashed password as previously done to determine the port numbers.
Due to the limited number of available TCP port numbers (1,024-65,535), and de-
pending on the number of available MAZE nodes, the schedule generation algorithm could
compute a tunnel from a source end-point of an existing tunnel (IP address and port number)
to a different destination end-point, causing a collision. We cannot have two tunnels from
the same source to two different destinations. In Section 5.1, we discuss possible solutions
to handling tunnel collisions.
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Figure 4: Generate a schedule by continuously hashing the previous hashes of the password,
and using the hash outputs to determine the tunnel end-points.
3.1.1.2 Tunnel Setup The actual setup and building of tunnels is performed by a
forwarding program, run on the gateway node. The forwarding program is responsible
for establishing tunnels specified by the schedule; each tunnel is between two nodes (source
and destination end-point) but the tunneling (i.e., forwarding of the data) is performed by
the gateway. The tunnels are used by the client program to hop from one node to the other,
retrieving file pieces at each node. To hop from node to node, the client program connects
to the current machine (i.e., localhost) at a specific port and the tunnel redirects the con-
nection to a different node at a different port. The idea is that the client program should
not know which node they are connecting to, until they are connected to it. The forwarding
program first runs the schedule generation algorithm to get an array of tunnels. Then, it
iterates through the array and establishes the tunnels accordingly. In Section 4.1, we discuss,
in detail, the implementation of tunnels using SSH tunneling.
MAZE uses tunnels for two main reasons: (1) a tunnel provides a secure connection
over an untrusted network link and (2) it is single-use and one-way. A tunnel, as defined
in MAZE, can only be used once. After a program uses a tunnel to connect to a different
node, that same tunnel cannot be used again unless it is re-established. Single-use tunnels
are important to decreases the chance that an attacker can find and use an available tunnel
before an authorized client program uses it. Authorized client programs know the exact ports
they need to connect to in order to traverse a tunnel, to store or retrieve a file. Since they
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know the exact port, they can connect to it directly and have their connection forwarded
to the next node. Meanwhile, attackers are just guessing for available ports in a brute-force
manner, which is slower.
It is important to note that since the MAZE system can be thought of as a graph, the
starting node of an attacker and an authorized client program are the same. They must
both start at a gateway node, which is an internet-reachable machine. Other nodes are not
publicly reachable through the Internet. Therefore, since attack agents and client programs
both start at the same node but the client program knows exactly which ports to connect to
in order to arrive at the subsequent node, a client program has a higher chance to use the
tunnel first, rendering it unusable by the attack agent.
In order to prevent an attack agent from just non-stop trying to connect to all ports,
the MAZE system employs a periodic refresh, in which all non-root processes, including
the attack agent, are killed . We can add an additional layer of protection by introducing a
delay once a node wants to connect to localhost. Because an attacker has to try all possible
ports, the delay causes an attacker to require increasingly more time to find the correct port
while a client program can just connect directly to the port. Even though an authorized
client will also have a delay when connecting, it is just one added delay per tunnel.
3.1.2 Client-Side
The MAZE client-side is responsible for (1) accepting parameters from the user (e.g.,
whether to store or retrieve a file, the path to the file, and a password) and sending them
to the gateway; (2) splitting the desired file into pieces; and (3) executing a program that
follows the tunnels and either stores or retrieves the file pieces.
3.1.2.1 Client Program The client program is command-line program, that runs on
a user’s machine, used to access and interact with the MAZE cloud storage system. It is
responsible for accepting a list of arguments and sending the arguments to the gateway. The
client program requires the following parameters: (1) -s, storing of a file, or -r, retrieving of
a file, followed by the path to that file; and (2) -p, the password with which to compute the
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schedule. A file stored with a password p must also be retrieved with the same password p.
For example, the command below stores a file called book.txt with a password of pittsburgh:
$ maze -s book.txt -p pittsburgh
Similarly, the command below retrieves a file called book.txt with a password of pittsburgh:
$ maze -r book.txt -p pittsburgh
3.1.2.2 Storing and Retrieving The storing program is part of the MAZE software
package that is installed on all MAZE nodes. It is executed on the gateway after establishing
the appropriate tunnels. The storing program follows the schedule, connecting to the respec-
tive ports (source port numbers) to arrive at subsequent nodes and copying the appropriate
file pieces from the client to the current file node.
The retrieving program is also part of the MAZE software package. It is almost identical
to the storing program; it follows the schedule of tunnels, but instead of copying file pieces
from the client to the current node, it copies them from the current node back to the client.
3.2 Tradeoffs
A significant bottleneck of the MAZE design is the use of tunnels. When a client wants
to store or retrieve a file, a set of tunnels are established for client programs to traverse. In
the current implementation of MAZE, the number of tunnels is passed in as a user-specified
argument for performing experiments with different numbers of tunnels. Establishing and
traversing a tunnel requires more time than directly connecting to a node through SSH.
Therefore, having more file pieces results in more tunnels to traverse and slower performance.
However, at the cost of slower storing and retrieving speeds, an increase in tunnels results in
greater security. An attacker needs a certain amount of time to find each tunnel, and they
are assumed to find each tunnel sequentially 1. In other words, only after they find the first
1Traffic analysis techniques can enable the attacker to discover the tunnels in parallel. We leave this
attack model for future work.
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tunnel can they try and find the second tunnel in the schedule. Therefore, the more tunnels,
the greater the total time an attacker needs to find all the tunnels. If the total time is greater
than the node refresh period, then the attack fails. This tradeoff between performance and
security is analogous to that of Onion Routing [41], in which the larger the number of layers
or hops, the slower the performance. However, this slow-down in performance allows for
increased security for anonymous browsing of the web.
3.3 Proactive Approach
The proactive MAZE approach involves a periodically and constantly changing
re-configuration of tunnels. In proactive MAZE, tunnels are already established (i.e., do not
wait for client programs to connect to setup tunnels) and tunnels are pseudo-randomly torn
down and new ones are established. In this section, we provide an overview of the proactive
MAZE approach, although we do not implement it in this work.
In proactive MAZE, the cloud storage system configuration is represented as a graph of
nodes connected by edges (i.e., tunnels). It involves pseudo-randomly changing the system
configuration by constantly tearing down tunnels and establishing new ones. The system
configuration is publicly known, therefore anyone can know which tunnels are currently
established. In the reactive MAZE approach, a password is used to determine the source and
destination end-points of tunnels. However, in the proactive MAZE approach, a password
is used to determine the nodes in which to store or retrieve the file pieces. The schedule
generation algorithm in the proactive approach is responsible for using the password to
determine a list of nodes and determine which file pieces are to be contained in which node.
The aforementioned is collectively known as the schedule. Based on the schedule, we compute
the shortest path (through the tunnels) that visits all the nodes in the schedule, before the
system reconfigures, to store or retrieve a file. On a timely basis, the system reconfigures
and file pieces at each node are modified through proactive secret sharing techniques.
The proactive approach introduces the idea of node shuffling, in which the content of the
nodes (i.e., file drawers) are shuffled amongst other nodes. The node shuffling algorithm is
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publicly known, in other words, anyone knows which node’s contents moved to which other
node. Recall that file pieces are structured as drawers. Since authorized client programs
have the password, they can determine which nodes currently contain the drawers in which
their file pieces are stored in. Given those nodes (that contain the appropriate drawers), the
client program computes the shortest path that visits those nodes and accesses the respective
drawers to store or retrieve file pieces. An attack agent does not know which drawers contain
their desired file pieces. Therefore, they resort to copying all the contents of a node, most of
which are fake files with gibberish data. In order for an attack to succeed, it must retrieve
all the file pieces before the system reconfigures because after reconfiguration the file pieces
are modified such that they become incompatible with the previous versions. The advantage
of the proactive approach is that response time is much faster since the tunnels are already
established once a user wants to store or retrieve a file.
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4.0 MAZE Evaluation
In this chapter, we evaluate the performance and security of the MAZE cloud storage
system by implementing the proposed design, and building an experimental platform to
perform experiments on MAZE. In Section 4.1, we describe in detail our implementation of
MAZE and in Section 4.2 and 4.3 we present and analyze the experiment results.
4.1 MAZE implementation
In this work, we focus on the implementation of the reactive MAZE approach, accom-
plished through a series of C programs and Bash scripts. We divide the implementation
into two parts: the service-side and the client-side, which correspond to the service-side and
client-side in the MAZE design.
4.1.1 Service-Side
The service-side programs are responsible for listening for incoming connections from
client programs, and parsing the user’s arguments to generate the schedule. Once the
schedule is generated we can iterate through it and establish tunnels accordingly. In our
implementation we use the libssh library build tunnels using SSH.
As mentioned previously in Figure 2, the hardening of nodes, drawers, machine iden-
tity obfuscation and proactive secret sharing are currently not implemented in MAZE and
therefore not discussed.
The service-side consists of the following programs (all of which are run on gateway
nodes):
• Gateway Program: Listens for incoming connections from client programs.
• Master Forwarding Program: Generates and iterates through the schedule establishing
tunnels at the respective end-points.
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• Master SSH Server Process: Generates and iterates through the schedule starting
SSH servers at the tunnel destination end-points.
4.1.1.1 Gateway Program The gateway nodes run a socket server, implemented using
the POSIX sockets API, that listens for incoming connections from client programs. Once
the server receives a connection from an authorized client, it reads the incoming the data
(i.e., the user’s parameters) and parses the data using the strtok C library function, storing
the parameters in an array. We did not implement client authentication as it is orthogonal
to this work. After receiving parameters from the user, the gateway begins the tunnel setup
process. We fork a new process to run the master SSH server process and fork another
process to run the master forwarding program, passing the password as an argument to both
programs. Once the SSH servers and tunnels are established, the gateway either runs a
program to store a file or retrieve a file, based on the user’s parameters.
4.1.1.2 Schedule Generation Algorithm We represent a schedule as an array of tun-
nels, where a tunnel is defined as the following C struct:
struct Tunnel
{
char ∗ s r c ;
char ∗ s r c p o r t ;
char ∗ dest ;
char ∗ d e s t p o r t ;
} ;
A tunnel consists of: (1) a source node (char *src), represented by an IP address; (2)
a source port number (char *src port), which is the port number at the source node that
leads to the tunnel; (3) a destination node (char *dest), which is the node that the tunnel
leads to, represented also by its IP address; and (4) the destination port number, which is
the port number at the destination node (char *dest port) that the tunnel connects to.
The schedule generation algorithm uses SHA256 to continuously hash a password in order
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to determine the source and destination end-points. We use the OpenSSL [12] C library,
in the implementation, since it has built-in functions to generate SHA256 hashes from a
given string. The first source node in the schedule is the gateway node. In other words, the
source node of the first tunnel in the array of tunnels is the gateway node. To determine
the remaining members of the tunnel (source port number, destination node and destination
port number) we use SHA256 to create an arbitrary string of 256-bytes from the password.
The first two bytes of the hash are converted to an integer to determine the 16-bit TCP
source port number. The same is done to the last two bytes of the hash to determine the
16-bit TCP destination port number. The middle two bytes are converted into an integer
to determine the destination node. The integer value of the middle two bytes represent an
index into an array of available file nodes. If the index is greater than the length of the
array, we mod it by the length of the array. The aforementioned steps determine the first
tunnel in the schedule. To determine the second tunnel in the schedule, we use the previous
destination node as the source node of the next tunnel, thus creating a connected series of
tunnels. Then, we perform the same process as before, using SHA256 to hash the previous
hash output and using it to calculate the other members of the tunnel. Depending on the
number of available file nodes, it is possible that file nodes are used more than once.
MAZE uses SSH to establish tunnels and to connect to other nodes. SSH listens on
a default port of 22. Other than port 22, SSH allows port numbers between 1,024 and
65,535. Therefore, we must ensure that when calculating the source port number and the
destination port number, that it falls between the range of 1,024 and 65,535. We achieve
the aforementioned using the following formula:
port number = integer hash value % (65535 - 1024 + 1)) + 1024
where integer hash value is either the source or destination port number determined by
converting the first or last two bytes of the hash output into an integer.
In the current MAZE implementation, the number of tunnels is passed in as a user-
specified parameter because, in the experiment section, we want to test how the number of
tunnels affect performance. We do not handle tunnel collisions in the current implementation,
but discuss possible solutions to collisions in Section 5.1. The password that we used in the
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experiment happened to have no collisions for up to 80 tunnels.
4.1.1.3 Forwarding Program Tunnels in MAZE are implemented using SSH through
the libssh C library. To establish the tunnels, we use a combination of reverse port forwarding
and direct port forwarding, both of which are described thoroughly in Section 2.3. The
forwarding program is run on the gateway, which performs the actual forwarding of data. In
Figure 5 we illustrate an example of how the tunneling is implemented in MAZE.
Figure 5: Implementation of a tunnel in MAZE. Both S and T are file nodes. Each node
runs an SSH server listening at port 22 and only accepts connections that use the access-
protected administrator key for authentication. The destination file node T additionally
runs an SSH server that listens at the destination port number and accepts connections only
from localhost using the client key for authentication. When the client program starts an
SSH connection to the source port on node S, its connection is forwarded through the tunnel
to the SSH server at the destination port on node T.
In the Figure 5 we have three nodes: node S (the source), node T (the destination) and
the gateway node. The red tube represents reverse port forwarding and the blue tube
represents direct port forwarding. We refer back to this Figure and their nodes when
explaining the implementation of the forwarding program.
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The forwarding program takes as input four arguments: (1) the source node’s IP address,
(2) the port number at which the source machine listens for requests to be forwarded, (3)
the destination node’s IP address, and (4) the port number at which the destination node
listens for incoming requests.
In the code snippet below, we first ask node S (from Figure 5) to listen for incoming
SSH connections. Then, the forwarding program blocks and wait for incoming requests; once
it receives a request, the incoming SSH channel (connection) is saved as an ssh channel
object.
/∗ Lis t en f o r incoming connect ions ∗/
rc = s s h c h a n n e l l i s t e n f o r w a r d ( s e s s i on , hos t s e rve r , hostport , NULL) ;
. . .
/∗ Accept incoming TCP/IP forwarding channel ∗/
channel = s sh channe l a c c ep t f o rward ( s e s s i on , TIMEOUT MS, &port ) ;
/∗ TIMEOUTMS r e f e r s to the time ( in m i l l i s e c ond s ) t ha t
the tunne l s t a y s open f o r .
∗/
. . .
Once data are received from S, we can begin the forwarding process to node T as demon-
strated in the code snippet below. We open an SSH channel dedicated for forwarding the data
using the ssh channel open forward(...) function and pass it the required parameters.
// Create a forwarding channel
f o rward ing channe l = ssh channe l new ( s e s s i o n ) ;
. . .
r c = ssh channe l open fo rward ( forward ing channe l , d e s t s e rve r , destport ,
hos t s e rve r , hos tpor t ) ;
Afterwards, we read data from node S through its SSH channel and write that data to
node T, through the newly created forwarding channel, effectively forwarding the data. In
addition, we also do the opposite, where we read data coming from node T and write it back
to node S. A code snippet of the aforementioned is provided below:
while (1 ) {
// Read by t e s from incoming channel
nbytes = s sh channe l r ead nonb lock ing ( channel , bu f f e r ,
s izeof ( b u f f e r ) , 0 ) ;
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i f ( nbytes > 0) {
// Write b y t e s to outgo ing channel
nwr i t ten = s s h c h a n n e l w r i t e ( forward ing channe l ,





// Read by t e s from incoming channel
nbytes = s sh channe l r ead nonb lock ing ( forward ing channe l ,
bu f f e r ,
s izeof ( b u f f e r ) ,
0 ) ;
i f ( nbytes > 0) {
// Write data to SSH channel




The forwarding program establishes a single tunnel between two nodes. However, the goal
is to build all the tunnels specified in the schedule. Therefore, we built a master forwarding
program, run on the gateway node, that is responsible for iterating through the schedule,
forking new processes to call the forwarding program (described above) and giving it the
necessary parameters in order to build all the necessary SSH tunnels.
4.1.1.4 SSH Server Program The SSH server program is responsible for starting SSH
servers at a node. When the forwarding program establishes a tunnel from a source end-point
to a destination end-point, we ask the source node to listen at a specific port and when a
program connects to that port, they are redirected to the destination node at a specific port.
In order to connect to the destination node a specific port, the destination node must have
an SSH server listening for requests at that port. The MAZE software package includes
scripts for both starting and stopping SSH servers. We illustrate the opening of an SSH
server in the code snippet (Bash script) below:
# $1 = por t number o f SSH se r v e r to s t a r t
#!/ b in / bash
i f [ ! −f ˜/ . ssh / i d r s a $ 1 ] ; then
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# Generate SSH key f i l e
ssh−keygen −t r sa −N ”” −f ˜/ . ssh / i d r s a $ 1
f i
# Replace por t number in con f i g f i l e
sed − i ' 5 s / .∗/ Port ' ”$1” ' / ' s s h d c o n f i g
# Restar t SSH
/ usr / sb in / sshd −h ˜/ . ssh / i d r s a $ 1 −f . / s s h d c o n f i g
The ssh-keygen command generates a host key file, if one does not already exist, which
is required when starting an SSH server. The sed command looks for the port number in
the SSH config file and replaces it with the desired port number. Then, we run the sshd
command and specify (1) the newly generated host key, and (2) the modified sshd config
file, which opens an SSH server at the desired port.
To stop an SSH server, we locate the process ID of the SSH server and kill it. We
illustrate the termination of an SSH server in the code snippet (Bash script) below:
# $1 = por t number o f SSH se r v e r to terminate
# Determine address o f SSH se r v e r
addr=” 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 : ”
addr+=$1
# Find process ID of the SSH se r v e r to terminate
pid=$ ( n e t s t a t −ant −p tcp | grep ssh | grep −m 1 $addr | \
awk ”{ pr in t \$7}” | cut −f 1 −d”/” | sed ' s /\ s .∗ $// ' )
# Terminate SSH se r v e r
k i l l −9 $pid
The expression in the pid=$(...) line finds the process ID of the SSH server at the
desired port. Once found, we stop it using the kill command.
The SSH server program, described above, starts an SSH server at a single node. There-
fore, similar to the forwarding program, we built a master SSH server program that is re-
sponsible for iterating through the schedule and forking new processes to start SSH servers
at all the tunnel destination end-points.
38
4.1.2 Client-Side
At the client-side, a command-line program is responsible for accepting arguments from
a user (e.g., whether to store or retrieve a file, the filename, and a password) and sending
those to the gateway. Then, at the gateway, after the service-side programs are executed,
client-side programs are run, which traverse through the tunnels and store or retrieve file
pieces.
The client-side is consisted of the following programs:
• Client Program: A command-line program on the user’s machine that accepts and
sends arguments to the gateway.
• Storing Program: Traverses through the tunnels, storing file pieces at each node.
• Retrieving Program: Traverses through the tunnels, retrieving file pieces at each node.
4.1.2.1 Client Program The client program is a command-line program, that runs
on the user’s machine (i.e., the client node), and is responsible for accepting parameters
from the user and sending those to the gateway. We implemented the client program in
C, which uses the getopt C library function to parse command-line arguments. Before
sending the arguments to the gateway, the client program splits the desired file into pieces
using split command, available in Unix-like systems. The split command accepts many
optional arguments, of which, we use the -n option to specify the number of pieces to split
the file into, and the -d option to use numeric suffixes (i.e., the pieces are numbered).
The user parameters are concatenated into a single string, separated by spaces, and
sent to the gateway. We implement sockets using the POSIX sockets API, however, data
transferred through plain sockets is not encrypted and could thus be visible by packet sniffing
software. We encrypt the socket connection with SSH direct port forwarding, which we
discussed thoroughly in Section 2.3. In summary, a tunnel is setup from the user’s machine
to the gateway, which transports the data (the user’s parameters) through a secure SSH
connection.
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4.1.2.2 Storing Program The storing program copies file pieces from the user’s machine
to file nodes; determines the source port number to connect to in order to arrive at the
subsequent node in the schedule; and then runs the same storing program at the newly
arrived node. The aforementioned approach effectively works in a recursive manner; at each
traversal, the storing program checks if it has already traversed through all the nodes, if not,
calculate the source port number, connect to it, and run the storing program at that newly
connected node.
The implementation of the storing program is separated into two components. The first
component computes the source port number but does not connect to it; and the second
component copies the respective file piece from the user’s machine to current node, and then
connects to localhost at the source port number, which traverses through the tunnel to
arrive at the subsequent node.
The schedule contains all the source and destination end-points that the storing program
needs. However, we do not directly use the schedule in the storing program because it would
have to be either passed in as a parameter (which could become costly as the schedule
becomes larger) or it would have to be recreated at each storing program. The source port
number is computed by converting the first two bytes of the password hash into an integer
value and ensuring the value falls between the valid range for TCP port numbers. Therefore,
in the storing program we just need to hash the previous password hash output to compute
the source port number in order to traverse the tunnel. As such, we pass in the previous
password hash output as an argument to the storing program, such that it can be used to
compute the source port number.
The first component is implemented as a C program, which requires the following argu-
ments: the user’s IP address, the filename, the file number, and the previous password hash.
When the storing program is first executed by the gateway, the file number is the number of
pieces the file was split into. The C program begins by hashing the previous password hash
using SHA256 to get a new 256-byte hash and using that new hash to compute the source
port number. Then, the C program decrements the file number and checks if the file number
is equal to zero (which means all pieces have been stored); if it is not then it executes the
second component, implemented as a Bash script, and passing it the following arguments:
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the user’s IP address, the filename, the decremented file number, the source port number,
and the new password hash; if the file number is equal to zero, then we do nothing else (do
not execute the Bash script) because we have already copied over all file pieces from the
user’s machine to the respective MAZE nodes.
The second component, implemented as a Bash script, is responsible for determining the
name of the file piece to be copied, copying over the file piece from the user’s machine, and
then connecting to localhost at the source port number to arrive at the subsequent node
and run the storing program from that node.
A code snippet of the Bash script (the second component) is provided below:
#!/ bin / bash
# $1 = user ' s IP address
# $2 = f i l ename
# $3 = f i l e number
# $4 = source por t number
# $5 = prev ious hash
# Determine f i l ename
f i l ename=”${2}${3}”
# Copy f i l e p i e ce from user ' s machine to the curren t node
scp − i ˜/ . ssh /maze . pem $1/ $ f i l ename . /
e r r=1
while [ $ e r r −ne 0 ]
do
# Connect to l o c a l h o s t a t the sourcce por t number
ssh l o c a l h o s t − i ˜/ . ssh /maze . pem −p $4 −t \
” . / s t o r e \$1 \$2 \$3 \$5”
e r r=$?
done
The Bash script begins by concatenating the filename and the file number to determine
the name of the file piece to copy over from the user’s machine. Then, the script uses the
scp command to copy the file from the user’s machine to the current node. We traverse to
the next node in the schedule by connecting to localhost at the source port number using
SSH, which traverses the tunnel. In the SSH command, we use -t option, which executes
a command at the destination node once the SSH has succeeded. We use the -t option
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to run the storing program (the first component) at the next node giving it the required
parameters. By executing the storing program at the next node, we effectively create a
recursive process. The while loop is used to try and traverse through the tunnel until it
succeeds. It is impossible that the client program traverses through the tunnels faster than
they are established. Therefore, we try to connect until it succeeds, which is slightly faster
than waiting for all the tunnels to be established and then executing the storing program.
4.1.2.3 Retrieving Program The implementation of the retrieving program is almost
identical to that of the storing program. The retrieving program is also separated into the
same two components: a C program and a Bash script. The C program is identical since the
process of computing the source port number is the same. The difference lies in the Bash
script. Instead of using scp to copy file pieces from the user’s machine to the current node,
it does the opposite. It copies file pieces from the current node back to the user’s machine.
We illustrate this in the code snippet below:
#!/ bin / bash
# $1 = user ' s IP address
# $2 = f i l ename
# $3 = f i l e number
# $4 = source por t number
# $5 = prev ious hash
# Determine f i l ename
f i l ename=”${2}${3}”
# Copy f i l e p i e ce from user ' s machine to the curren t node
scp − i ˜/ . ssh /maze . pem $ f i l ename $1
e r r=1
while [ $ e r r −ne 0 ]
do
# Connect to l o c a l h o s t a t the source por t number
ssh l o c a l h o s t − i ˜/ . ssh /maze . pem −p $4 −t \
” . / r e t r i e v e $1 $2 $3 $5”
e r r=$?
done
We notice that the Bash script is almost identical to that of the storing program except
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for the scp command, which copies file pieces from the current node to the user’s machine.
In addition, after it connects to the tunnel and arrives at the next node, it executes the
retrieving program at that node, once again creating a recursive process.
4.2 Experiment Setup
Our experimental platform used 12 t2.micro Amazon EC2 instances [1] with 8GB of
memory running Ubuntu 16.04. All Amazon EC2 instances were located in the us-east-1
region (North Virginia). We setup one instance as the gateway node, one instance as the
client node, and the remaining ten as file nodes. The setup process involved downloading
the MAZE software package on all instances.
We evaluated the performance of MAZE by performing two experiments. The first
experiment tests the overhead of using MAZE to store and retrieve files with varying file
sizes (50KB, 100KB, 1MB, 100MB, 500MB and 1GB) with a constant number of tunnels (10
tunnels). We generated test files of varying sizes using the mkfile command in MacOS. The
second experiment tests the overhead of using MAZE to store and retrieve a file of size 100
MB with a varying number of tunnels (10, 20, 30, 40, 50 tunnels). The overhead of MAZE
was calculated as follows:
average store/retrieve time with MAZE - average store/retrieve time without MAZE
average store/retrieve time without MAZE
where average time is the average time (in seconds) of ten executions of storing or retrieving;
and without MAZE refers to transferring file pieces through scp. For storing and retrieving
without MAZE, we generated schedules of varying tunnels (10, 20, 30, 40, 50) and output the
destination node’s IP addresses to a text file. Then, we wrote a script that reads that text
file, line-by-line, and splits the desired file into the appropriate number of pieces (where the
number of pieces is equal to the number of tunnels) and transfers them to the destination
node through scp. For all the experiments, we only use one client and do not take into
account the time to split or assemble a file as they are independent of the tunnels. In
addition, for all experiments, we use the same password, pittsburgh, which does not have
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tunnel collisions for up to 80 tunnels. In order to compute the time elapsed for storing and
retrieving a file with MAZE, we modified the storing and retrieving program to record the
time at which the tunnel setup process started (before the establishing of tunnels) and the
time at which the last piece of a file was stored or retrieved. Since we are using Bash scripts
to recursively traverse the tunnels, we could not directly compute the elapsed time (end
time - start time) within the Bash script since it does not support floating point subtraction.
Therefore, we would compute the start and end time using Bash and output those times into
a file, which we transferred back to the client node. Then, we used Python to read those
files and calculate the elapsed time.
4.3 Results and Discussion
Figure 6 displays the overhead of storing and retrieving a file with sizes: 50KB, 100KB,
1MB, 100MB, 500MB and 1GB with 10 tunnels. We observe that, in Figure 6, the overhead
of both storing and retrieving a file decreases drastically from about 300% to about 50%. In
addition, we notice that the overhead for small files (50KB, 100KB, 1MB) was very similar,
around 300%, but the overhead decreased as file sizes became larger. The reason for the
aforementioned is that, for small files, the primary bottleneck was the establishment and
the traversal of tunnels, while for large files, the primary bottleneck was the size of the file.
Recall that the establishment and forwarding of a connection by a tunnel is performed by
the gateway. Therefore, for each tunnel, the connection is first sent to the gateway and only
then forwarded to the destination (a triangulation). As such, a tunnel is inherently slower
than a direct connection to the destination. However, as the file size increases, the overhead
of a tunnel is overshadowed by the overhead of transferring a large file piece. We expect
that with even larger files, the overall overhead of MAZE decreases even further. Therefore,
we can conclude that MAZE is best suited for storing large files. If a user wants to store
multiple files with MAZE, it would be more efficient to package the individual files into a
single large file and store the large file.
It is important to note that we used t2.micro Amazon EC2 instances, which are low-tier
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VMs offered by Amazon AWS. They are described to have Low to Moderate networking
performance. The networking performance of the VM would often cause traversing through
tunnels to be slower than usual. In addition, we only had ten Amazon EC2 machines for
testing, therefore, when the number of tunnels was greater than ten, VMs would be reused.
In Figure 7, we evaluate the overhead of storing and retrieving files with MAZE with
varying number of file pieces. Recall that the number of file pieces corresponds to the number
of tunnels. Therefore, ten file pieces with MAZE, represents splitting a file into ten pieces
and generating a schedule of ten tunnels. In terms of without MAZE, we also split the file into
the same number of pieces as with MAZE (e.g., ten pieces) but instead of traversing through
the tunnels, we generated the schedule and simply used scp to transfer the pieces to the
destination nodes. We observed that the overhead of storing and retrieving increased as the
number of tunnels increased. As mentioned previously, the cost (in terms of response time)
of traversing a tunnel is greater than that of directly using scp to transfer files. Therefore,
it is natural to expect the overhead of MAZE to increase as the number of tunnels increases.
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Figure 6: Overhead of Storing and Retrieving File Pieces with MAZE (varying file sizes)
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Average Retrieval Time (secs)







Table 1: Average time (rounded to the nearest thousandths) to store and retrieve files with
and without MAZE (varying the file sizes)
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Figure 7: Overhead of Storing and Retrieving File Pieces with MAZE (varying file pieces/
tunnels)
Average Storing Time (secs)
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Table 2: Average time (rounded to the nearest thousandths) to store and retrieve files with
and without MAZE (varying the number of file pieces / tunnels)
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4.4 Security Evaluation
In the system model, we discussed that attacker agents can gain control over a node
in the MAZE system. From that node, however, since the attacker agent does not have
the schedule, it does not know what port it needs to connect to and therefore resorts to
brute-force connections to every possible port. Moreover, because the tunnels are one-use
only, once a client program traverses through a tunnel, the attacker can no longer use that
tunnel. As such, since the client program has the schedule, they are able traverse through
the tunnel first, rendering it unusable for an attacker. Once an attacker reaches a node it is
only a matter of time until the attacker agent is killed by the periodic refresh.
To evaluate the security of MAZE we developed an attacker agent that attempts to
connect to every possible unreserved TCP port (1,024 to 65,535). The average time of ten
executions was 343.937 seconds or 5.732285 minutes. Therefore, if we configure the periodic
refresh to be less than half of 343.937 seconds, an attacker agent should be killed before
successfully finding an available unused tunnel.
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5.0 Conclusion
Cloud storage systems are rising in popularity for both business and personal use due
to the increase in online collaboration and cloud storage’s promise to be accessible anytime,
anywhere. However, the static nature of cloud systems enables attacker to thoroughly study
the system and its vulnerabilities without fear of the system configuration periodically chang-
ing. To address the aforementioned, we propose MAZE, a cloud storage system that employs
Moving Target Defense and uses tunneling to prevent attackers from freely hopping between
machines and retrieving desired files. The experiment results and analysis demonstrate that
MAZE is suitable for transferring large files because as the file size increases, the relative
overhead of MAZE decreases. In Section 5.1, we discuss limitations of MAZE and possible
solutions thereof. Then, in Section 5.2, we detail future directions for MAZE.
5.1 Limitations
Legitimate unreserved TCP port numbers range from 1,024 to 65,535. Due to the lim-
ited amount of port numbers, it is possible that collisions may occur. A collision occurs
when MAZE attempts to establish a tunnel from the same source end-point to a different
destination end-point. In other words, if a server is already listening at a certain source
port number and forwarding connections to a certain destination end-point, it cannot be
asked to listen at the same source port number but forward the connection to a different
destination end-point. Attempting to do the aforementioned will result in failure to establish
the tunnel. Collision can occur in two situations: in schedule generation for one client or
due to concurrent clients. Collisions occur in schedule generation for one client when, in
the same schedule, two tunnels to have the same source port number due to the first two
bytes of the password hash output being the same. Collisions occur in concurrent clients
when the schedule of multiple clients contain the same source port numbers but different
destinations. To address this shortcoming, we can keep a list of open port numbers (i.e.,
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port numbers not used as tunnel end-points) and once there is a collision we could use linear
probing. However, if all ports are being used, we can keep a queue of tunnels that want to
established at a certain source port number. Once a tunnel in the queue is used, we can
establish the next tunnel in the queue. The drawback of this approach, is that a user may
experience performance slowdown because they have to wait for previous tunnels to be used
and for new ones to be established.
The CAP Theorem [23], proposed by Eric Brewer, states that a distributed system can
only guarantee two of the three characteristics: consistency (all nodes have the same data
in the same state), availability (every request receives a response), and partition tolerance
(system does not fail with some malfunctioning nodes). MAZE provides consistency because
tunnels are one-use only. For example, if a user is storing a file with their password and at the
same time attempts to read the file, the reading of the file has to wait for all the tunnels from
storing to complete before trying to read. In addition, we can support partition tolerance in
MAZE by employing a technique called Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) [40]. IDA
splits data into f different pieces such that only k of the pieces have to be retrieved in order
to regenerate the original data, where k ≤ f . Therefore, if we split a file into pieces using
IDA, and distribute them to the appropriate nodes, even if some nodes are down we can still
regenerate the entire file. However, MAZE cannot guarantee availability because of tunnel
collisions. Storing and retrieving a file may require more time if other users opened tunnels
at the same source end-points.
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5.2 Future Work
In this work we focused on designing, implementing and testing the reactive MAZE ap-
proach. However, due to the limited number of Amazon EC2 machines used in the evaluation,
some features of MAZE went untested. In our implementation, we only had one gateway
machine. The drawback of having only one gateway node is that it is highly susceptible to
DDoS attacks, which can significantly slow down the system. In future work, we would like
to explore techniques to protect gateway nodes from possible attacks. For instance, we could
use IP-hopping to constantly randomize the IP-address of the gateway such that it is only
accessible to authorized users. In Figure 2, many features of the service-side were not im-
plemented, such as the black-hole nodes, hardening of nodes, machine identity obfuscation,
and proactive secret sharing. In future work, we would like to build out these features and
evaluate their performance and security.
In addition, we want to build an attack simulator for performing security evaluation
experiments on the MAZE system. For example, more intelligent attackers would attempt
to determine the end-points of tunnels through traffic analysis. Furthermore, we would like
to explore sophisticated open-source network scanning tools, such as Nmap [36], that can
scan ports in parallel, and examine whether a client can traverse through the tunnels before
even Nmap can find the tunnels. We also plan to implement the proactive MAZE approach
and compare its performance and security against the reactive approach. The proactive
MAZE approach can be implemented by weaving in components from the reactive approach.
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